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CHAPl'ER I 
HISTORY OF STOCK PURCHASE PUNS AND STOCK OPTIORS 
The purpose ot this paper 1s to present a reasonabl3" adequate presen-
tation of some ot the developnents in Stock Ownership Plans tor Employees. 
Plans tar employee stock ownership have developed into two categories, 
one more often relating to employees 1n general and the other more often 
relating to a restricted number of employees, usuall.T executive. 
Stock Purchase Plans. These plans are usuaU,. designed tor employees 
in general, although some spec1tical~ exclude executive employees. Such 
plans are designed primarily' to give more and more employees a direct owner-
ship in the canpanies by whom the;r are employed. Perhaps the major problem 
that' arises is the failure or inabilit:r of so man.v employees to tully com-
prehend the posits.on of a holder or common stock. Another problem in these 
plans relates to the fact that, even it employees were .tull;r aware of the 
position or a holder or common stock, not all anployees are in a position 
to take the risks that go with it, especial.17 in the corporation upon which 
they depend for their salaries or wages. 
Stock Option Plans,. These plans are usuall1' designed tor a relatively' 
terr high-level employees and are motivated almost exclusivelT by reason ot 
Federal income tax considerations. Among this group ot employees there :t.s 
a much better comprehension of the position or a ccmmon stockholder and more 
or them are :tn a position to take the related risks. The major problems in 
these cases are (1) the ever-changing income tax laws affecting the taxabil-
it:r of profits that may result .from the options and (2) the ettocts on other 
stockholders, part1oularl;r the minority stockholders. 
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Because the problems that relate to employee stock ownership plans are 
substant1all:r different in the pl.ans designed for employees in general as 
against those designed tar certain executive employees, the two types or 
pl.ans will be discussed separately after a review Of Stock Ownership Plans 
for Employees 1n general. 
For manr ye8.rs stockholders, business executi ws, and employees have 
tollorredwith'interest various plans designed by certain corporations to 
permit,' encourage, or assist employees to purchase capital stock 1n the com-
panies b:Y whom the:r are employed. · 
On December 17, l9S6; Hr. Keith Funston~: President· o.t the New York Stock 
Ex:change, said,· "The Employee St0ck Ownership Plans ot many large companies 
are proving highly ef'i"ective in giving more and more Americans a.direct owner-
ship interest 1n our business system,..;-br1ng1ng us nearer to a true democrac:y.nl 
Tma popUlarity of Stock Omlership Pl.8ns has been and :ls still apparent 
from the f'act that appradmatel:r tort:r per cent or all domestic companies 
· having common stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange adopted stock pur-
chase or stock option plans within the nine-year period from 1947 to 1957. 
There were additional plans ·started prior to 1947, and many- have been put 
into effect since· 1957. Such· plans are ·not in any- sense restricted to ccm-
panies listed on the New York Stock Exchange but rather cover corporations 
or all siees and types. 
Some of these plans have been eminently successful. in the attainment ot 
their goals while others have been most unsuccessful. Th:!.$ wide var:tat1on 
l stock· Ownership Plans~ !nt>lczees, New York Stock Exchange, 
Decanber 1, . 1956., p. l. . 
in the degrees ot·succese ori"a:tlure bas resulted in certain deep-seated 
anxieties as to the consequences of the use or th1s method of cultivating 
the employee's loyalty to his own canpan:y and confidence in the private 
enterprise system generally'. · 
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Kost of the plans relate to canmon stock and :1.t is this fact that con-
tributes largel.1' to the anxieties. Ho way has yet been found by which 
employees, or anyone else, ·can enjoy- the benefits of common stock ownership 
without being subject to the related risks. In consideration of the risks 
they assume, the owners of cO!lmon etock are claimants against all the corpo-
rate profits that remain after income taxes and responsibilities to preferred 
stockholders have been met. To the extent, · thereforet that common stock-
holders receive dividends that tall short of these profits, they make, on a 
more or less permanent basis, further contributions to corporate assets. 
There are many investors whose savings are such that they- should not in-vest 
in securities that have the lowest olaim on profits, particularly' when :Lt is 
very probable that a substantial portion ot the remaining profits will be 
permanent]\r retained by- tbs corporation.· This partial retention of profits 
canbines nth the absence ot a maturity- date to make the comnon stockholder 
largely- dependent on the "market" as a means ot recovery of his investment. 
ThU8, market fluctuations come to assume too great a basis of gaitl or loss. 
There is a related question. U an employee ts "investing" his life's 
efforts as an employee of' a given corporation, m.ightit not be better tor him, 
in order to spread bis risk, to invest his savings 1n another corporation. 
It is difficult.to determine whether this point is more relevant when the 
em.ploree's savings are little in amount and his duties as an employee have 
no part in management and policy decisions or when his savings amount to a 
substantial SU111 and his duties as an employee do have a part in management 
and polley decisions. 
In the process ot the developn.ent ot these plans, since no one ot the 
. plans is exactly like another, the more recent plans have brought with them 
man1' new features. These new features usually' have been designed in an 
effort to 1mprove the chances of tho attainment of the ultimate goals or to 
overcome certain impressive potential objections by the stockholders or a 
part thereof. 
The continued success or the many' emplOJ'8e stock owrterahip plans has 
resulted 1n part from continued favorable economic conditions and changes in 
the provisions ot the Federal income tax laws. It :ls interesting to note 
that The Revenue Aot ot 1964 has materially restricted the income tax benefits 
ot m.aft1' stock option plans. 
While the list ot companies that have adopted stock Olfllership plans is 
V8r1' impressive, it must be said that the list ot canpanies that have not 
adopted 8tl1' such plan is also impressive. 
CHA.Pmt II 
STOCK PURCHASE PI.AUS 
Stock purchase plans are plans by which companies permit, encourage, 
or .facilitate the acquisition or stock by employees. In making it possible 
for an employee to acquire a substantial stock interest, a stock purchase 
plan serves an objective long sought by maey' shareholders-giving manage-
ment and other employees an identity with stockholders. In sane corpora-
tions, stock purchase plans may eventually result in replacing "hired-band" 
management with stockholder management. 
Employees Elis!ble to Partioipa.te. Some plans are designed tor large 
numbers of employees J sane include otfioers and key employees J still others 
epecificall.1' exclude officers and key- employees. 
The Fmployeest Stock Plan ot American Telephone and Telegraph Compmv 
provides ror participation by ''aiv regular employee. • • • except officers 
• • 
• .n2 
The Employees' Stock Purchase Plan ot Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
Compaey prov:J.des tor participation by "any empl()yee of the Compaey ••• 
except (a) directors (b)·otticers (c) persons included in the StockOption 
Incentive Plan. u3 
The Employees• Stock Purchase Plan ot Canmomvealth Edison Canpany,· 
hmvever, provides that "All regular employees ot the Edison Company, regard-
less ot their position or rate or pay- ••• may participate in the Plan a.a 
long as they' are regularly employed."4 
2 PrC?8J)ectus of American Tel!hone and Telef.?!ph Company, October 21, 19'4. 
3 Prose:ctua R !§! Chesapea and .Q!i!2 fiailway Compan,y, April 28, 1955. 
h rz-ospectus ~Commonwealth Edison canpanz, June 17, 1955. 
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Assistance or Contribution bl Canpanz. In some plans the companies do 
little more than act as agent or broker tar the employee, purchasing stock 
for him in the market and at market price. Some companies take a further 
step and advance loans to the elliploy9e to · enabl.8 · h1m to make the purchase, . 
Still a further step takes place when the· ccmpany offers the stock to mployeee 
at some price below the current market price. In some eaaos· the plan 't'llJ3.'9' 
Prov;tde tor a contribution ot can.pa!J1' funds to employee. purchases, in effect 
the equivalent or· an increase in his cmpensation • 
.Amer1can·Telephone and Telegraph Compan;r sets a price on the stock as 
follows• "The purchase price per share ••• will be $20,00 below the average 
market price either tor the month in which payment is canpleted or for the 
next succeeding month, whichever is lonr ••• ,n5 
Bridgeport Brass ComparJ7 provides tor purchases at prevailing market 
pr:t.ces. ibe company- su1'Ports :lts plan by explaining that there will be sub-
stantial savings under its plan by the elininat:lon ot brokerage costs,6 
· The Commonwealth Edison Caapal\V' plan provides that tho price per share 
will· be ninety per cent of the closing market price but not less than $25.oo 
per share.7 
Genera1 Foods Corporation provides that tor each.five shares purchased 
under its plan for the account of an employee-participant, the corporation 
will deliver to him, Without coat, an additional share.a 
Source of Stock. In the majority of oases previously authorized but 
·unissued stock is wsed tor both stock purchase and stock opt1on plo.ns. In 
some cases; however, the stock is purchased on the open market. 
56 ProSP!ctus of American To~hone and Teleg:ra~Wf.1l' October 21, 19.sh. Prospectus ~ m"§eport · ss ~~' Sep r , 952. 
1 Prospectus ~ Commonwealth Edison com,eanz, June 17' l9SS. 
8 General Foods 021J2oration !nl>l9Y!es 5av.l!1j! Investment Plan, 
November, 1955 •. 
7 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company set aside 3,0001000 shares of 
its authorized but unissued stock for its plan. The Chesapeake and Ohio 
Bailwa:r Compaeyreserved lX>,000 shares of common stock tor its plan out of 
authorized but uniseued stock. 
D1£f1culties. The encouragement or ownership of a company' a stock b;r 
. employees is a matter ot general interest to· business executives and one 
over which there is great diversity' of opinion. On the one hand there is 
general belief' that conflicts between economic classes can be reduced bya 
more widespread diffusion of securities among employees. On the other band 
there are very deep-seated fears as to the·consequences ot the use ot this 
method of cultivating the employee's loyalt,' to his om company' and hiB 
ta:i.th in the private enterprise econany-. ·These fears arise trom the tact 
that no way baa 18't been found b:r which employees, or &l\YOne else, can enjoy 
the benefits ot common stock with their risks. When the:r om stocks which 
tluctuate seriously in valuet and in particular when they sustain losses 
which are heavy in proportion to their means, then stock· ownership by 
employees is likel;r to have tho reverse etteot f'ran that which was intended. 
Instead of more eontidence in the compan;r, there is less contidenceJ and 
instead of loyalt,>, there is likely to be disappointment and antagonism. For 
these reasons many businessmen hesitate to embark upon such plans. The:r 
refer to some well-knorm plans of the 19201s and earl:r 19.30*s in which verr 
heavy losses were sustained by empl01E39 stockholders. The memor.r of these 
still lingers, and one vice-president, referring to them, remarked, "We newr 
had an employee stock purchase plan, tbank·God.n9 
9 Thomas H. Sanders, Effects of Taxation on Executives (Boston: 
Division of Research; Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard 
University, 1951), P• 121. 
8 
Since stock prices have risen impress!:ve:cy- since 1950, the plans 
. started since 19S01 tor the most part, haw proven ver,r successful tor the 
.~rtio1pants. In most cues it would seem tbat stock purchase plans are 
more suitable tor old, well-established companies in 'Well-knom industriea.10 
In a117. case it would seem that any plans to otter the company• s stock 
· to its employees should be undertaken onl;r with great care and with the 
frankest explamtion to the anployees of the ldnda ot risk they are Wlder- .• 
taking, and the possible consequences, Even registration statements filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission do not fully cover all of the 
problems involved. Their formal style a~ technical statements make little 
or no impression upon people not.trained to understand them. If a plan 
cannot be presented to employees in plain and simple terms,. which will at 
the same time inform them or the risks involved, and yet be su.t.ticiently 
attractive to induce them to .buy the compatl1'' s stock, then the comparry• s 
management bad better leave the problem or interesting workers in the private 
enterprise system to other deviees.11 
Efforts to Overcane Difficulties. The toll.owing excerpts from certain 
companyannounceme11ts ot employee stock ownership plans illustrate efforts 
to avoid some of the difficulties heretofore mentioned. 
Bridg!Port Brass Cgnpanz. "No pranotion ot this plan bas been under-
taken because the Directors teel that any employee wishing to become a stock-
holder should know that such a plan 1s avail.able to h1m, but should not feel 
any urge from management to take up the plan.12 
10 Sanders, loc. cit. 
11 Sanders, ~cit.', p. 123. 
12 Prospectus 2£Br:tdseim-t Brass, . September 11 19~. 
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The Cincinnati Gas and Electric CO!J?!ny• "In the belief that the 
investment :ln equity securities by employees"would tend to acquaint them 
with scene or the problems confronting businese in general, and their com-
pany in particular, and that the ownership ot such, shares would create in 
them a greater sense ot responsibility toward the successful operation ot 
their company, as well as broaden their concept of the American free enter-
prise system.nl3 
Commonwealth F.dison Canpa!ll• '1First, we are not trying to induce you 
to b~ Edison stock. It you wish to participate 1n the Plan, we Will be 
glad to have you do so. But your standing will not be atf'eoted in any way 
by your decision. No one is authoriaecl to urge you to participate. 
"Second;· when you are making up your mind whether or not to buy' Edison 
shares, you must rem.ember that the prices of common stock, including Edison 
stock, go up and dom. At times the decline may be drastic. 
"Third, once you have purchased Edison shares, they will be yours. The 
company will not buy them back from you at any time. 
"Fourth, we recognise, and you should not hesitate to f'aoe the fact.; 
that not all employees are in a position to take the risk that goes with the 
ownership of common stock.nlh 
General Foods Corporation. "Although we believe this plan to be a sound 
one, we caution each employee to give careful consideration to his own ~ 
all financial situation and to the nature or the program. In our literatute 
we cite the element of risk in ccmm.on stock.nl$ 
13 ProBPE?ctus ~!!'.!!Cincinnati GEis !!!! Electric C~n.v, March l~, l9SO. 
lh·ProsJ,?!!ctus ot Canmomrealth Edison, Junel7, 195~ 
lS ProsP<:c~us ~General Foods Corporation, November 28, 19$$. 
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General Motors Corporation. "No one will urge them to take part in 
this program. Tho decision to do so will be entirel.1' their own.n16 
fnland Steel Compan;r. "Our program is voluntary. Ho employee need 
participate. In fact, great care is taken to explain that the pUl"Cbase ot 
common stock is a risk which might result in losses as well as profits.nl7 
The success of ma~ emplQ1eG stock ownership plans depend largely on 
the success or the compaD1' involved. Ma117 such plans started in the 1920'e 
were abandoned in the earl.7 l9~'s. some, however, survived. An outstanding 
er.ample of a surviving plan is that established by sears, Roebuck and Compalll' 
on July l, 1916. As of December 31, 1955, there 1l'G%'e 1251299 participating 
employee-mEmbers. The company's contribution for 195S' (computed at ten pe1' 
cent or consolidated net incane) was $40,362,020 and employees owned 
l8,805,S06 shares or 2~.4 per cent of the company's capital stock. 
The Seara, Roebuck and Company plan 1a a Savings and Profit-sharing 
Fund, control over which is legally' and financial~ separate f'rom compaD1' 
management. The sources ot capital far the f'und are (l) the deposits ot 
employee members, and (2) the annual contribution by the company. With these 
tunds1 shares ot Sears, Roebuck and CanpaflY' common stock are purchased. 
l.6 Prosf?!ctus ot General Uotors Corporation, November, 195S. 
17 Prospectus~ Inland Steel Conprq, July 13, 19$.S. 
CHAPTER IV 
SmmARY OF LISTING APPLICATIOlB FILED BY COMPANIES 
LISTED ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCIJANGE2 19h7-195S 
The folloaing information was taken trom an analysis ot arrangements 
tor issue of stock to employees, officers, and directors as described in 
listing applications tiled between 1949 and 19.SS by ccmpanies listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange. 
ot the eighteen listing applications filed in 1947, only eight plans 
represented stock purchase plans and ten represented stock option or compen-
sation plal'lS. Seven of the eight stock purchase plans covered all regular 
employees whereas all ten stock option or compensation plans were limited to 
executives or key employees. All ~ight or the etock purchase plans provided 
f'1r' installment purchases, sane over periods as long as ten years. 
ot the twelve listing applications in 19h8, ten provided tor stock 
purchase plans and onl,y two for stock options. Seven plans covered officers 
and employees, two plans covered oniy selected executive employees, and one 
covered only key' employees. In this year, three of the ten plans required 
f'u1l cash pa~ent and.oeven bad a provision tor installment purchases. 
The following schedule shows the increase in the popularity of stock 
ownership plal'lS tor employees and the breakdomt of these plans u between 
stock purchase plans and stock option plans. 'l'b1s was prepared f'ran listing 
applications filed with the New York Stock EK:change during the years shown. 
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NUMBER OF NUMBER OF 
N&i STOCK NElV STOCK 
TOTAL NUMBER PURCHASE % OF CHANGE OPl'ION % OF CHANGE 
!EAR OF NEW PIAJ5 PIA15 FRW 1949 PI.Am FRCU 1949 
-
1949 22 18 
-
4 
-19$0 29 25 28.00 h 
-1951 7h l5 -16.67 59 1375.oo 
19S2 94 17 -5.55 77 1825.oo 
1953 77 22 22.22 55 127S.OO 
19!)4 77 21 16.67 '6 1))().00 
19S5* 8h 21 16.67 63 lh75.oo 
*(10 mos.) 
Source: Stock Ownership Plans for of:?lOY;!!S, New York Stock Exchange, 
December, 1956; pp. ll.R • 
Generally', the majoritJ' Of the stock purcbaae plans listed above covel' 
all regular employees. 
Fran the above it is obvious ,that while the numberot stock plans for 
employees among the ccmpanies listed on the Ne1r York Stock Exchange increased 
fran tnnt,....two in 1949 to a high ot eighty'-four in 19.$2, there was little 
increase in stock purchase plans covering employees in general, In l9h9, 
there were orilT tour stock option plans among companies listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange, bttt the number increased to fifty-nine in 19$1 and a 
high ot seventy-seven in 1952. 
OHAPJ.'lm V 
STOCK OPl'ION PLA?B 
!'!Wses. Stock options help a ccmpany create adequate er:ecutive 
incentives and rewards. Toda.1's tax rates, living costs, an:t expenses inci-
dent to executive office render it difficult, it not impossible, for execu-
tives to accumulate an estate from savings out ~current ccrnpensation·, The 
stock option plan involves no corporate expenditure or funds and, in tact, 
brings more funds into the business. · It provides a method for the smaller 
compaey, the growth company, the canpany with leverage stock, and the c<>mpany' 
unable to otter·subatant1al cash rewards to compete tar executive talent with 
large established businesses. 
!zlRloYt:es El;isible to Participate. The groeat majority of stock option 
plans to cover only executives and key employees. General purchase plans 
open to all anployees, such as those heretofore discussed, do ~t satisfy 
all the purposes involved in giving executives and key employees a substantial 
interest in their business, of a kind that is like4' to serve as an effective 
incentive. In particular; the close connection between successtul executive 
. . . 
effort and profits cannot be expressed in· the tom ot general stock purchase 
plans. For this purpose stock opt.ions are comonly regarded by C:SOl!lpatd.~ as 
the suit.able instrument• the one most attractive to executives. 
· ~feet ot Federa1 Income TaX Legislation. The substantial increase in 
atook option.plans in recent years ma7 be traced in large part to legislation 
first.passed in 1950, oonf'erring epecU'io Federal income tax benetits on 
rest.rioted stock options. 
The legislation, in substance, provided that 1£ a nontransferable stock 
option is granted to an employee 1 and it at the time of the grant the option 
price is at least ninet:Y'-five per cent of the market value ot the stock 
covered by the option, no tax will be imposed when the option is exercised. 
The tax payable will be at capital gains rates on any protit if and when the 
stock is sold. H09'0Ver 1 the stock cannot be disposed of bet ore two years 
from the time the option is granted. The law also required the holder to 
wait six months arter exercising his option before selling the stock obtained. 
Review of Federal Income Tax Status. The contusion over the taxabilit7 
ot stock options has a long history- extending back to 19211 when Congress 
set up separate rate structures for ordinar.r :lncane and capital gains. As 
long as incane tax rates remained relatively low, this cleavage wasn•t too 
hlportant, and for years the Commissioner ot Revenue held that the profit on 
emplo~e stock options was extra canpensation and taxable as ordinary- incQlle 
at the time the options were exercised and the stock acquired. In 1938, the 
Board of Tax Appeals (now the Tax Court) ruled that an option granted to an 
executive o:r Continental Can Company- ns a 11proprietary'1 option and his pro-
fits when the option was exercised were not taxable as ••canpensationu. The 
.folloaing year the Treas\11'1' Department decreed that all prot1 ta on prop:d.ef.ar1 
options would be taxed, not on acquisition ot the stock, but when the stock · 
was sold, and then on'!1' at capital gain rates. The Treasury' agreed to con-
sider the evidence 1n each case and decide whether the option was proprietal'J' 
or CQ!lpensator,r. other executives subeequentfy defended their options aa 
proprietar;r,. but often the courts held them to be compensatory-. The decisions 
hinged on a number of factors including the stated "intent" ot the option, 
the length of time before it could be exercised, whether or not it was 
assignable, eta. But the factor that seemed most. decisive was the degree 
ot spread between the option price and the marlmt price at the t:t.me the 
option was granted. The narrower the spread, ·the more likely it was that· 
the option would be held proprietary.· The rule was not rigid; however, the 
spread 1n Geeseman•s 11proprietarY" option ns forty-five per cent. 
The contusion aver tax.ability of options was further compounded ~n l94S 
when the Supreme Court held 1n the Smith case that the profit reallied by 
John H. Smith when he exercised an option granted by- his employer, the 
Western Cooperage Company', was taxable as ordinary incane,; even though there 
had been no spread between the option price and the value of the stock when 
the option was granted. The court declared that the section of the revemie 
law that defines gross income 111s broad enough to include in taxable income 
any economic or beneficial benet1 t conferred on the employee as ccmpensat1on 
wbateVer the form or mode by which it 1s errected11 • On the strength of this, 
the TreaSU%7 ruled that options issued after the Supreme Court decision would 
be regarded as canpensatory· and the profits taxed as ordin8r.r 1ncc:ue when 
the options were exercised. 
This ruling thoro~ dampened down enthusiasm ot business executives 
tOz. stock options, and between 1946 and 1950 very few plans were in:Ltiated, 
H0vrever, during those years 'J.mryers, corporation executives, and spokesmen 
tor ·the tlational Association of Uanufacturers, the New York City- Bar 
Association, and the New York State Society or Certified Public Acoountanta 
~ Congress to ease the treatment accorded options. Tbs 195<> Revenue 
Act did so and provided the way- tar corporations to grant "restricted stock 
options" that would provide capital gains regardless or what the ca.upany• s 
mOtivea in granting the option might be. 
Congress, however, attached a few restrictions. Among the conditions 
that must be met bet ore an option can qualify are 1 
(l) the option cannot be transferred. 
(2) the anployee receiving the option cannot hold more than 
ten per cent of the aanpany' s voting stock. · 
(3) the employee has to exercise his right to purchase while 
he is enplo.ve<I, or within three months after leaving the 
CQllpB.ny. . . 
(4) the stock purchased cannot be sold for at least two years 
after the option 1s granted. 
($) the atook bas to be held tor more than six months atter 
the option is exercised. 
· (6) the option price can be no lovrer than eighty-five per 
cent of the ttfa1r market valueo when the option was 
granted. · 
(7) when the price was between eighty-five per cent and 
ninety-five per cent, the entire spread between the 
option pr.tee and the market value when the option is 
granted will be taxed as ordinary income, but only when 
the stock ia sold. 
Except tor these restrictions, however, Congress 1mpl1c1tl.7 let all 
other advantages of stock options stand. There was, tor example, no limit 
on the number of shares that may be ottered or on the number oE option 
offerings, or on the number or earnings of employees who may participate. 
Thus, the 1950 Revenue Aot left enormous latitude for variety among rostrioted 
option plans. In tact, no two option plans are alike. Some companies otter 
options to only one or two menJ tor example, President Frank Stanton ot the 
Columbia Broadcasting System in 1954 held options to buy- a total ot ,0,000 
ebares of his company•s stock for $1,703,000. Some option plans are extended 
to "keY" exeoutivesJ others include on~ officers. While most companies 
Umit their option otters to unissued stock, the percentage ot total option 
shares to outstanding stock prior to the option may range anywhere from l 
to· 10 per cent or more. Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, tor example, 
ottered over.11 per cent. In genernl, restricted stock-option plana have 
l? 
tended to favor an option price or ninet1'-'five per cent or market value, 
rather than the permissible e1ghty--f1ve per cent. By limiting the option 
spread to five per cent, or by eliminating the spread entirel.T, a c<.mpa117 
can assure an executive that all his option profits will be .treated as 
. _capital gains. Moreover, a small spread is less 11.kel.T to anno:r stockholders 
when they are asked to approve the plan. 
Approval or option plans by stockholders has not stopped attacks on 
the legality ot such plans. One of the few restricted-option cases decided 
against a corporation involved California Eastern A1rwa18; Inc. In 19~2 
the Delmmre Supreme Court declared the company's option plan invalid because 
it did not include a clause requiring the executive to remain with the com-
pan.v tor a reasonable time, and thus in effect ottered rewards to management 
.with no guarantee of a return to the corporation. Since this decision, 
.man.v companies have revised their option plans to include "employment 
clauses" that require participating executives to serve the company for at 
least one or two years. 
Though the restricted stock option attracted a host of companies atter 
19SO, some executives and la1lyera thought such options still had several 
"weaknesses". One was the requirement that an executiw hold his option 
stock tor- s:lx months be.tore he sold 1t, since even this minimum gamble could 
cost h1m a sizable sum. 1t the market value or the stock happened to drop 
during the time he· held the stock. Thie danger was amply' illustrated in the 
case or the restricted stock option on 1001000 shares that Radio Corporation 
ot America granted in l9SO to Chairman David Sarnoff. Sarnoff obtained 
t1,77S,ooo in personal loans from banks and exercised his option 1n Februar7, 
19S3, when R.C.A. stock was worth $2.S.So, or $7. 7S above the option price. 
Five weeks later the stock price had risen to $28.25,, and 1f' Sernott bad 
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been tree to sell, he would haw had a capital gain o.t $1,05o,ooo. But 
then the stock began to tall, and~ September when the six months• holding 
period expired, R.c.A. had dropped to $23.50. Since the banks were umr.llllng 
to renew hie personal loans in full, Sarnoff' decided to sell some ot his 
stock. To avoid depressing the falling market, he sold ?S,000 shares oft 
the market to private investors through Lazard Freres and Company' for about 
. . 
821.5<> a share. This gave him #1,612,SOO, but to this he bad to add most 
of his personal sav:l.nga to pay o£t his loans and acquire the remaining 
25,000 shares tree and clear. Had Sarnoff been able to hold on to all his 
option stock, be would have bad a potential capital gain of $1,487,~ as 
of m1d-0Ctober, 19~. As it turned out, he made a capital gain ot $281125<> 
on the 7$1000 shares and bad a potential gain of $3711875 on his ranaining 
251000 shares as ot mid-October. 
It ns not considered likely that Congress would relieve executives 
ot the necessity of taking at least six months' gamble on restricted options. 
For, ~requiring this holding period, Congress intended to prevent 1ns1ders 
from manipulating a company''s stock by frequent trading. However, two 
changes in the Revenue Act passed eubsequent]3' made it possible fem companies 
to protect executives ll'ho have unexercised options against a deol:tne in the 
market value·or the ccmpany's stock. 
Under the new·rule on the "modification, extension, or renewal" of a 
restricted stock option, a compan:.v could lower the option price ot a stock 
whose average market value over the preceding twelve months had been more 
than 20 per cent below the market price when the option was granted. Protec-
tion against a short-term decline in a stock• e market value was provided 
by a new "variable atook-opt1on" rule. This allowed an executive to exercise 
his option at a price that could be as per cent (or more) o.t arry market 
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wlue of the stock d111'1ns a spec1.t1ed six-months' period, and the option 
must be exercised in that period. Thus, 1t the market pr:lce ol his com-
pany• a stock dropped, an executive can nit and exercise bis option at the 
lowest price during the six-monttas• period. 
OQ'JJ.pa.nies whose stocks were either closely held, not traded frequently, 
or not listed on securities exchanges have tound restricted options more 
d:ltt1cult to employ. For some years one problem was the requirement that 
restricted stock options be granted only to holders ot less than 10 per cent 
ot a canpany' s stock. This irked owner managers who naturall.1 wanted options 
themselves, and who argued that :tr they offered stock options to other 
managers in their companies they might lose voting control. The 19$4 Revenue 
.Act rE1?1ed1ed this by permitting the grant of five-year stock options to 
holders ot more than 10 per cent of a company's voting stock on condition 
that they pay at least 110 per cent ot the fair market value for their option 
stock. But Congress has so tar done nothing to solw the chief option pro-
blem facing thousands ot small and closely held canpanies. This is the 
difficulty ot fixing a "fair market value'' for their stock. A cC111patl1' offer-
ing the executives rest.1-icted options may sit an option price at what it 
estimates to be SS per cent ot the stock's market value. But the Treasur.r 
may claim that the real market value is much higher than the compallY''s 
est1ma.te, and that the option price is therefore less than 8, per cent. Such 
option would not quality as "restr1otedt' and all the profits accrued when 
the option was exercised would be taxed as ordinary income. This would be 
so, at least, unless the company would convince the Treasury or the courts 
that the option was indeed "proprietarytt • 
The only alternative to proving that a nonrestricted option 1s proprie-
tary is for a canpany- to admit that the option is designed to provide 
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compensation. For an executive to get capital-gains treatment on this kind 
ot option, a different concept was adopted, namel.1' that the option . :ttselt 
. . 
is considered to have.value. Thie value is the compensation intended. It 
the executive is willing to pay income taxet'! on this ftlue far the year the 
option ia granted, he may be able to secure capital gains treatment on all 
profits realized on bis.option. 
. . The ei'f orts of corporations to aecure capital-gains benefits for 
executives by granting them options are, ot course, quite legitimate. But 
do much emphasis has been placed on the tax-avoidance aspects or options 
that it bas tended to obscure the basic purpose ot granting options, which 
:ts to gi'V'e executives an incentive to stay with a compan,y and help improve 
its earnings. 
Some companies, such as Corn Products Refining, use stock options as 
a form of def erred compensation to ease the economic problems ot retfrem.ent. 
other canpanies, such aa lloore-UcCormack Lines, prefer to award options to 
younger men who are expected to boost earnings tor many- years. In still 
other.companies, .options are used as a short-term incentive for kq execu-
tives. Yale and Towne M'anutacturing CompatJT, tor example, adopted a f1ve-
:vear option plan in 19501 which provided that executives who received the 
options could not exercise them. for at .lea.et three years. B,- this restriction 
President .Gilbert w. Chapman aimed to hold together for at least three ~ 
the new executive team he had set up. 
Effectiwness or Pl.ans. The big test ot the incentive-producing value 
ot option plans, ot course, w1l1 arrive when-and-it there is a prolonged 
decline in the stock market. In a booming bull market, stock options haw 
brought many executives immense profits-on paper at least. The,-•ve enabled 
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hundreds ot companies to bang on t.o keY' executives or to attract top t.alent 
from other companies~ 
When stock prices talll many- stock option plans) far the time being at 
least) become wrtbless to both companies and executives~ In 19$7~ during 
a slump in stookmarket prices, some stock option plans tared about as 
tollcwsr 
COf!PANY 
AlaSka Juneau Gold 
Black and. Decker 
Cincinnati Gas and Electric 
Columbian Carbon 
Eastern Stainless Steel 
Emerson Radio 
Flintkote 
Or819on-Rob1nson . 
Korvette 
National Steel 
Pennsylvania Railroad 
Royal KcBeG 
Banta Fe Railroad 
Scott Paper 
Shell OU 
Figure I 
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3S.oo 
)).00 
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36.00 
S.37 
13.62 
~9.00 
16.12 
23.12 
19.62 
Sh.37 
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. Such a situation brought fcirth canments such as, 11sure, no one promised 
me I•d make money- on the option, but it waa held out as an employment attnc-
t1on and now it' a a mirage" J "I•ve got an option you can have right now". 
A taltering stock market has made many an a>eeoutive•a employment con-
tract tar less attractive than when he signed it • 
. c~ reactions to executives• comments wried fran serious concern 
to amazement that their executives may- be disgruntled because their options 
are worthless at present •. One COJJIP8D3' president snapped, "Wf\v should our 
people be upset? After all., it•s difficult far them to lose on options, 
ther don't have to exercise them, you know". Another said, "It you are after 
a quick profit on a stock option plan, you have no business asking ;your 
stockholders to approve it".18 
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It the stock market should slump drast1ca~, restricted option plans 
at .lea.st could be ttmodilied" to give some executives a new start on their 
0 tree-r1de" at a lovrer option price. This, however, would not protect those 
who had already exerciaed their options, and it many ot them chose to cash 
in their profits betore the ccmr:pany's stocks tell belov the option price, 
they could ecarcelY' be blamed. But such profit taking would obviously- not 
support the theory that such options increase the executive's sense ot 
ownership. 
The incentive value ot stock options, ot course, cannot be accurate~ 
measured. For one thing, the movement ot an;r company's stock price is 
atteoted by man;r factors aver which management baa little or no control. 
Wars, depression, intlation, as well as maey other more modal'ate economic 
and physical factors ma:r well cause changes in a company' e comon stock 
market value tar beyond what management may control. Moreover, an execut1-p 
may become so absorbed :ln nuctuating personal paper profits that he neglects 
h1s dally chores. llr. Sarnoff, ot Radio Corporation Of Amer1ca.1 referred to 
earlier might bave been an example of th1s possibility. It 'll'OUld certa1nl3' 
appear that Vr. Sarnoff was faced with matters of a most pressing nature and 
rd.ze. 
other incentive systems, like bonuses tied to performance, ma:r seem 
better to sane companies. Restricted stock option plans often are a sore 
point with sane company stockholders. Their canplaints include: (1) stock-
holders generall:r aren't eligible to buy the stock at a lower-than-market 
18 "Ailing Options,," ~!!!!Street Journal, October 21, 1957. 
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price, (2) ccmpany officers already are getting enough momy, (3) the 
granting ot options increases the amount or oa:nmon stock outstanding, thus 
reduces earnings per share, and (4) u corporate officers have any faith in 
their mm company, they will invest 1n its stock via the open market. 
Difficulties of Plans. ~spite the profit potential in ma113' option 
plans, the,- often operate under ma!lY' dUf1cult1es. 
How can the option bolder afford to purchase the securities ottered 
to him? A right to buy stock may make an attractive incentive until the 
t:lme comes to find the cash to pay for it. In the case of many current 
stock options, inadequate attention has been given to this problem of financin1u 
as a result, the potential benefits to both managenent and the stockholders 
have been largel.T lost.19 
Uuch crit1c1sm 1s directed not against the principle of the stock Option 
plan, but against the unplarmed type of option wbich, ot necessity, w:1.ll 
require the executive to sell a substantial block of stock 1n order to pay 
for a relatively' tfl'if shares. This eelt-f':lnanoing type of option is expensive 
to the canpany. Also, it may be loaded with potential~ serious questions. 
' ' 
Here are a tew of the ditficultiess (1) Rapid shrinkage-the wasteful 
nature of the self-financing option is evident when we consider how maD1' 
shares must be sold to finance the purchase of the remainder. The exact 
nmber will vary with the percentage increase of the market rNer the option 
price but, under aey realistic assumption, the percentage sold Will have to 
be substantial. 
19 Harvard Business Review, Karch-April, l9S7, p. 137. 
Figm'e II 
SEU'-FINAMOINO OF A ].()()().SHA.RE STOCK OPrION AT S!b PER SHARE 
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So\Jrce ~ Harvard Business Review, Yaroh-AprU, 1957, p. l37 
Dilution ,of F1nity •. The issuance or so man;y shares sole~ to enable 
the executive to finance his option may also be wasteful fran the stockholder 
point of v.t.ew. It the option stock is authorized but previously- unissued 
and the executive must sell part of his option shares in order to acquire 
and retain the remainder, a dilution or equity will take place which hurts 
the executive as well as other shareholders. FOl' instance: 
Assume an option plan involves s~ of the company-ta outstanding ebares 
at the t1me the plan is adopted. Assume further that 7'5"' of the option shares 
must be sold to finance retention of the balance. Upon these assumptions, 
~ ot the total stock outstanding after exercise of the option will have 
been :Issued and outstanding 1n the bands or the public at large solely-to 
permit executives to retain an interest of only 1.2~ in the canpany. 
~ost to the Comps.mi;. As distinguished from dilution ot stockholders• 
equiey, there rill be a cost factor to the company in the case or both 
Ul'dssued and treasury stock. Thie cost can be considered the spread between 
the option price and market price of the option shares at the time ot 
exercise ot the option, since the company, 1n the absence of underwriting 
costs; brolmrage, or other factors, would ordinar113' be able to sell the 
option shares tor their market value. The cost factor is sometimes referred 
to u dilution. Thus, the Thiokol Chemical Corporation, in proposing an 
officers' abd employees• stock option plan, etateds 
"llanagement 1e mindful or the tact ••• because ot the ver:I' nature of 
an option, at 8tJ1' time when the options might be expected to be exercised, 
the Corporation probabl3' would be able to sell the shares subject to option 
tor higher prices than the option prices and the sale of such stock at the 
lOlll'er option prices will have the effect of diluting the position 0£ ex:isting 
stockholders". 20 
Stockholders Objections to Plans. While the restricted stock options 
are understandabl.7 popular with ex:ecut:lves who have received them, support 
far options is clearly- not unammous. A majority of the canpanies with l1sted 
securities on the New York Stock Ezchange have not yet adopted such plane. 
Although ferr top executives in these canpanies are prepared to criticise stock 
options (management obviously' doesn't want to denounce a plan it~ one da7 
decide to use-to attract a new president, far ex.ample), there is a general 
awareness in management of the case that can be made against prei'erent1al 
tax treatment for executives. In a 1950 speech to the American Bar Association, 
tat' instance, Dean Ervin N. Griswould of the Harvard law School asked the 
central questions 11Is there real.l1' •DY' decent just1tication tor the handouts 
llhioh are rep~ about to be given to a special tew taxpayers?" It is 
still a ditticult quest:ton to answer. For it raises many issues on 11hich 
even top managements are not unan1mous. 
20 Harvard Business Review, Knrch-Apr:J.l, 19S7 1 P• 138. 
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Are stock options real.J3 needed to attract new managers or to keep 
valuable key men from leav.t.ng? And are such options, which are. general.13" 
limited to top executives, good tor ccmpaeyta employoes, public and stock-
bolde%' relations? 
' 
Kost enecitically',. do stock options real~ accomplish what mall)" manage-
ments expect them toJ i.e., do they. increase an executive's incentive to 
!mprove company earnings b1 giving him "a stake in the business"? 
Negative answers to all these questions have not been lacld.ng. The 
sharpest oriti~ of option plans have been.minority stockholders who have 
generally attacked such plans on three countsr first, that granting options 
to btJ7 at bargain prices dilutes the equit~ or other stockboldersJ second, 
that. high-priced executives should not need an extra incentive to do their 
best tor the. companyJ and third, that options do not induce a "sense ot owner-
ship" in an executive unless there is sane assurance that he will continue 
to hold a .substantial part of his option shares. 
Harv managements, as already noted, have concluded that stock options 
are. ttot suited to their companies. Some of' the best managed companies 1 such 
as General Motors, have decided to continue to rely' on the incentive of a 
substantial bonus (in 0-U case, usuall.7 partJ.7 in stock) that can be tied 
much.more directlf to an executive's year-by-year performance. In other 
companies, pensions and deferred-profit sharing plans are used to stimulate 
nraagers. Om of the biggest disadvantages of a . stock option plan 'RS cited 
by. Preaident Joseph A. Grazier of American Radiator and Standard sanitary 
corporatiosu "In a staid company like ours llhose stock 1a not rising fast, 
an executive probabl3' could make enough on his option to provide aey real 
~cent:tve, and if the atock drops, his morale will probab~ go down too•. 
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Advantage!\! or Pl.ans. Yet, stock options have sane real advantages tor 
the corporation as well as the salaried executive. Owing to the cap1tal-
ga1ns treatment accorded profits on restricted stock options, the granting 
ot such options may cost the ccmpan:r much less than the granting ot a eala17 
increase large enough to net the executive as much as the profit on hie 
option. Also, a general o.ff'er ot stock options, in fact, Often is the onJ¥ 
- . . 
way a company can acquir&-or retain-the services of a top notch manager. 
It appears to bQ trne that the chance to acquire an estate through 
stock options undoubtedly produces acme increase in an executive's desire 
to stay with the company and keep it profitable, 
It appears f'ran available 1ntormat1on that stock options for officers 
and key enployees continue to be a major device used by nany- companies to 
obtain or retain outstanding executives, in spite or what appear to be valid 
objections to certain features or many plans that have been put :lnto et.teot, 
Review ot General Electric CgnPS;n.Y Plan. In its 1956 annual report, 
General Electric Company includes the tolloring comment relative to its stock 
option plan, 
"A total ot $6,8lh,3411fa8 received in 1956 fraa the sale of 267,668 
eh.ares or previously unissued stock to holdere or restricted stock options 
under the CompatJ7'• Stock Option Plan. Of this total, $11338,:bO repre-
sented the 8$ par value of the shares sold, and was added to the Common Stock 
Account. The . balance of tS,476,001 was added to Investiment :ln Excess ot 
Par Value ot Canmon Stock. 
The Stock Option Plan, approved by the holders of ')7.8% ot the shares 
voted at the 1953 Ammal Meeting, provides tor the granting ot restricted 
stock options to key employees. · The option price is market value on the 
date of grant, so there is ·no benefit to the option holder unless the market 
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price of the· stOck. increases, which benefits all share owners. This acts 
as .incentive for the employee.to use his best errorts onbehalt of the 
Company. As inducement to remain 1n the service .or- the Company', options mat 
not ·be exercised 1nmediately-, but onl;r in annual installments (over a period 
' ' ' 
general~ ot. nine to ten years) which bec.ana .exercisable as the individual 
remains in the emplOJ" ot the Canpanv. 
~t the beginning of 19S6, General Electric Company bad a total ot. 
3,258,195 shares of common stock subject to outstanding options •.. No addi-
tional restricted stock options for purchase ot the Canpany•a caumon atock 
were granted 1n 1956J 2671668 shares were purchased, aa noted in the follow-
. ' ' 
ing BtrrnmaX7J 761 771 shares were deducted traa orig:lnal grants in 1956 because 
ot ~the., ret~ents and nthdrawals1 leaving outstanding options for 
2,913,7?6 shares at the end of 1956. These outstanding options were held 
by 917 individuals. In eutmtt1ng the Plan to share owners, it n.a estimated 
that between 700 and 1200 ice,. employees would eventua~ participate in the 
' ' 
Plan. Of h,200,000 sharea which the share ownere authorized Ear use under 
the Plan, 6a0,364were unallotted at the close of 1956. 
. . . . ' 
A summarr of 19$6 transactions is ehovm beloss 
Net Installments Exercisable Shares 
Opt:t.on Year of ·Or1ginal Not Yet , Inst.allments·As .Purchased 
Price Grant Orants Exat'Cisable Yet U!!£?urob.ased in 19$ 
$23 3/Ji 19S3 l,h23,363 939,lh6 76,S2h 176,312 
2h i/6·' 19S3 788,7h2' .$32;806 80,1$6 ?l,7S3 
h$ 19~ 608,698 466,267 121,,727 17,900 
$2 1/4 19$5 6982833 618z?l6 78,414 1~703 ~a~9.t(;~ ~1~.1935 356,m~r ~~lz~S 
In ol"der to canbat and doubtless overccrne the possible stockholder crf' 
ot dilution of capital interest, General Electric grants options to key 
employees at the current marlmt on the date ot grant, so that there 1s no 
benefit to the option holder unless the market price of the stook increases, 
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which benefits all abare owners. 
'l'o overcane the objection that in sane sys in ma~ cases restricted 
stock Option plans do not actuall\r seri'e as incentives to ma.nagement1 iD 
addition to the fact that, unless the market 'Value or the stOok increases 
above the value at the t:lme o£ the option grant, there 1s no profit,. Oerleral 
Electric induces holders ot such options to remain in the service ot.tba 
Compaey b!1' not permitting the options to be· exercised inmediately but on:cy-
in annual installments over a period of nine or ten years. It appears that 
General Eleotric's plan must result 1n more incentive to stay t.ban mar>;.1pl.ans 
under which the option may be exercised in full in a relat:t.ve:cyi- short t!me. 
In these cases, a key employee, having exercised his option in fUl1 and having 
a substantial capital gain at hand, might easily be attracted to another 
company-, perhaps under a comparable plan. 
According to :lnf'ormat!on published by the New York Stock EJ:obange, 
General Electric's stock option plan provides for the stock obtained from 
such options to be paid tor in full in one payment. This requirement or a 
single cash payment in full leaves quite a problen at least for some Of the 
option holders. General Electr:t.c•s annual report states that h,200,000 shares 
had been set aside for their plan and that :lt was estimated that between 700 
and 1200 key- employees would eventuall\1 participate. It alsO states that at 
the end of 1956 there were outstanding options for 2,913,756 shares and that 
these options were held b1' 91? 1ndiv1duals. Assuming that a middle figure 
o.t 9$0 tmy employees eventual.lY participate . in the 4,200,000 set aside tor 
the plan, the average part:tc:tpent will be given an option or options far 
apprad.matel.141421 shares. On the basis or the la.at option price ot $~ l,lh, 
the total cost per participant w:1ll be appraximatel.7 $2.»,m. It is reason-
able to assume that certain high-ranking key' employees have or will receive 
nt0re ehares and, or course, some less. With today's high income taxes, the 
outlook for a continuation ot such high taxes, and the standard ot living 
normal.33 associated with such top keY' employees, the paymettt; ot $2301 99'1 1a 
a major obstacle. A s!ndlar computation of the average number ot shares per 
participant at the end ot 1956 results in a cost per key employee of appraxi-
.. 
mately $197,000. This amount, too, is a formidable obstacle. 
It might be said that the financing of a key employee's stock is h1s 
own personal problem and does not in aey traY' concern General Electric. It 
JD8.Y' be said that ever:1 b~ ot stock bears this same responsibility and that 
General Electric•s key employees are and perhaps should be like the othersJ 
that it he can't af'ford to buy the etock, he shouldn't buy it. 
There m&.Y'be a YeJ!'9' substantial difference between a·General Electric 
key employee option holder and the average stock buyer. It 1ir. Bl..ank, a 
General Electric key employee option holder has exercisable option rights 
tor h.421 shares, which were granted to him when the price ot the stock was 
· $S2 l/h, and the current market price of the stock was 875, he would perhaps 
be in the position ot not being able to afford to buy the stock: and at the 
same time ot not being able to at.ford to neglect to realize a capital gain 
ot $1001S78, particularly it he felt that 875 was a good price tar the stock. 
Even though he :ls a key employee of a large eompaD,7' with a very substantial 
salary, Ur. Blank might never undertake to buy- stock tn one compal'>Y' costing 
$230,997. 
O:f.' the wr1ous criticisms or restricted stock option plans, General 
Eleotr:lo'e plan seems to be vulnerable to that or not ~on.ding means tor 
paying tor the stock. In the absence ot reasonable provisions far maldng 
pa:yment tor the stock um.er option, unless Mr. Blank had a larger personal 
estate, espec~ as to available cash, than most key emp~s have, his 
on'.cy means of financing his purchase would be to dispose of a portion ot 
his stock :tn·order to pay-for the part be could hold. 
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. As far as the 1956. annual report disclosed Gt,neral Electric does not · 
require a ke7 employee to retain his stock but rather seeks to induce such 
employee to remain in the service of. the . compa.ny but making the options 
• t • " ' 
mcercisable oni,- in annual 1nstallr:1ents over a period genera~ of nine or 
ten ~ so long as the individual remains in the employ ot the Compaey. 
Recent ~ on Restrioted Stock Option Plans. "Under ~ Restricted 
Stock Option Pl.an far key employees of the Company and its subsidiaries, 
appr<>Ved by the Stockholders at the l9S7 Annual ?ie~irtfb on Januar.r 11 1962, 
there were 3761200 shares issuable under outstanding options and 282,187 
Ul'loptioned shares available for the granting of options. During 1962, options 
for a total~ 11,200 shares expired and, there.tore, on December 31, 19621 
.there were 36.$1000.shares issuable under outstanding options and 293,387 
unoptioned shares available for the granting of options. No options were 
either granted. or exercised during 1962 and there was no change in the . 
exercise price; viz., $21.00 per share urde1' all options except one for 
1,000 shares as to which the exarcise price was $19.00 per share.1121 
The tact '.t.bat no opt10ns were exercised during 1962 is not surprising 
since the market price ot the stock stayed below the option price ot $19.00 
throughout the entire year. 
"The incell'tive stock option plan far emcutives1 .adopted at the 1959 
annual shareholders' meeting provides that up to 3,000,000 shares of Jersey•s 
capital stock 'l!IB.'1' be optioned at prices not less than 100 per cent ot market 
21 !h!· Pennmvania ·Railroad c~El Annual Report tor the year ended 
December Jl, 1§62~ p. .32. ' 
value on the date ot grant. Changes that occurred during the year in the 
outstanding options, which may be exercised after two years or continuous 
employment f'ollcndng the date ot grant.. are summarized in the accanpa~ 
table. 
PI>tion Chanses Dll:ring·1962 
· Outstanding, December .31, · 1961 
Granted (to 625 executives at an average 
ot &S6. 79 per share) 
less: ElcercisGd 
Expired or canceled 
Outstarding, Decso.ber 31; 1962 
2,222,983 shares 
688,$00.sharee 
(362,17S) shares 
(16,309) s~ 
2,533,,399 "shares 2 
Figures are not yet available to show canparable intormation tor 19631 
but with the market price at the close of business on Yarch 11, l96b, ot 
· $813/4, it li'Ould be reasonable to forecast considerable activity- under this 
option plan. 
nccrporatiom' stock option plans fOl' their ezeoutiws are eitpeeted to 
be the object ot more than usual attention at annual meetings this spring. 
The plans, always controversial, have become more so recently. Some stock• 
holders probab]Jr Tlill have many questions to ask. The heightened interest 
has developed t.rom the $31891,Bll benefit obtained last year by seven top 
. . 
Chrysler Corporation execut1ws through options. · The size ot th9 Chrysler 
executives' profits was attacked. in Congress by Senator Albert Gore, 
Democrat of Tennessee •••• Sem.tor Gore said he was not charging t.bat the 
Chl-yslero officials v.lolated any law or that their company :ts alone in the 
practice, although he said be believes Chi"ysler took unusual advantage of it. 
22 Standard ,9!! CC!Jl.P!n:r (!!! Jersey;) 1962 Annual Report, P• 2$. 
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'This stock option privilege is a tax abuse which 1e growing,' he said,. t It 
is detrimental to the interests of the stockholders of the canpany involved 
and it is unfair to all other taxpayers. t n 
George H. Love.. Chrysler chairman defended the option plan. He said 
it was an incentive to the company"•s management and "helped the canpany write 
· one of the finest comeback stories in the annals or American business." 
"Tiro years ago Chrysler was noundering, n he said. "The search for top 
managanent candidates outside the company was fruitless-no one wanted the 
job. We tinall1' decided to entrust the fortunes ot the corporation to the 
younger but experienced and aggl"G&aiva men who were running it on an interim 
basis. B;y using stock incentives already approved b;y shareholders and thus 
holding out the opportunitY' to share in the company•a improvanent, good men 
both in and out ot the corporation were persuaded to tackle this reall.7 
formidable task." 
It would appear that Oheysler stockholders, :Lt they complain of these 
executives' benefits, should at least have mixed emotions •. Adjusting for 
stock splits since this new management took control of Chrysler's destilJY', 
the corporation's common atock has increased tran a market value ot $15.oo 
per share to a recent high of $49.00. Stockholders genera~ have shared 
the same benefits as have those few top-management option holders. 
Assuming that these management option holders each had a taxable income 
ot 3150,000 for 1963, exclusive of the gains .from these options, the addition 
of $555,967 ($31 8911 611 divided by' 7) regular incme would have resulted in 
an additional Federal income tax ot approx1matel.7 90 per cent ot the 8$S1967, 
or 3S00,370. BY" reason of the long-term capital gain benefit under the 
restricted stock options, the 8S5S,967 bonus could not reeult in an additional 
Federal income tax greater than 2~~ ot the bonus, or $138,992. The saving 
. ' . ' 
ot $361,378 per man is obviousl.Y' substant1al. 
While the inccme tax savings to the option holden 1s quite substantial, 
an7 stockholder who held stock during th18 period enjoyed tax benefits.at 
least equal to the benefits of the option holders. 
Although restricted stock options have always been highly controversial 
and un:ier more or less constant attack trom several sides, the tact that 
· Congress, the lmr, the courts, and most stockholders have generally approved 
would seem justification enough. But the most persuasive vindication for 
gt"anting management the chance to gain more at less risk than the ordinar;y 
investor is tbat this ahould make executives much more conscious ot their 
responsibility to stockholders, and perhaps produce larger profits for all. 
However the legislation first passed in 19~, which conferred Federal 
income tax benefits on restricted stock options has only recent]3been 
materia~ changed by the Revenue Act of 1964, which was enacted Febl"tJa17 26, 
19£>4. 
Some ot the new rllles are as tollowsi 
l. For full tax benefit, the stock must be held tor three yeare af'te1' 
cuercise.. (Form.er]¥ the holding period was six months after exercise 
and two years atter grant.) 
2. Grantee of option must be an employee of the granting corporation, ita 
parent or subsidiary, continuously trom grant to three months prior to 
exercise. (Formerl.3' a break 1n employment did not disqualify a restricted 
option if an employee were such at the time of grant and w1 thin three 
months ot exercise.) 
3. There must be a plan runnillg tar not more than ten years specit'y:l.ng the 
total option shares and the anployees or classes of employees to receive 
options. Stockholders must approve the plan within twelve months before 
or atter :lts adoption. (There was no such provision f ormerl:y',) 
4. Options rray run for not more than five years after grant. (Former~,· 
the period was ten years.) 
S. At the time of grant, the employee rray- not own, direct4" or indirect~, 
more .than 5% ot the stock (in voting power or value). It equity capital 
1s $1,000,000 or less, the S% is increased to 10%. (Fomerly, the 
restriction was 10% ot voting power regardless or capital but larger 
stockholders could qualify, subject to l5miting conditions.) 
6. For full tax benefit, the option price must not be less than~ ot 
market price ot stock at the time ot grant. A lesser pal" cent does not 
necessarily disqual:UY the option, but results in an increased tax. 
(Formerly, option plans were disqualli'ied it the option price was less 
than 85%.) 
7. Var!able options are not allowed. (They were allowed, former~.) 
8. To prevent a dOlrllllard readjustment of the price, a qualified option must 
provide that it is not to be exercised until any prior qualified or 
restricted options are f'ul.13' exercised or lapsed. nth certain exceptions. 
(Former]1', additional restricted stock options could be granted and down-
ward price adjustment was allowed in sane cases.) 
Ev1dent1¥ the number and the size of these option plans must have been 
ot considerable magnitude to haw warranted the time and attention reoentl.1' 
given by Congress in the New Federal Income Tax Law (The Revenue Act of 196b) 
and it w1ll be interesting to see how the corporations lfith stock option 
plans adjust to the new restrictions and how soon they tind a way to accom-
plish the end result that was heretofore permissible, one that they obvioual.1' 
considered very desirable and beneficial. 
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